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World Modelling from the Bottom Up*
William D. Nordhaus
Although opinions about world models vary from extreme
enthusiasm to unbridled outrage, there can be no doubt about
the success on one front: world models are the growth in-
dustry of the social sciences today. Three years ago the
Club of Rome could have been the euphemism for the local
wine-testing group. Today, it is hosting a pilgrimage of
world scientists in Berlin to view the latest models in the
haute couture of world thought.
A preview of one of these models was given during Octo-
ber 1974, in a three day meeting in Baden, Austria, hosted
by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA). The work presented there was a project prepared
by the Fundacion Bariloche, a mUlti-disciplinary group of
scholars from Argentina. The most fascinating aspect of the
Bariloche model is that it is a model about the world economy
built from the bottom of the economic ladder looking up,
rather than an elitist model built from the pinnacles of the
Cambridges--Massachusetts or England--looking down (or into
the future) at world problems. This perspective gives the
model a ring of authenticity. Whereas World Dynamics and
The Limits to Growth struck many as basically computer games,l
the Bariloche model has finally come to grips with the con-
crete problems of mankind. It is interesting that in so
doing they have combined a radical political philosophy with
a traditional set of techniques.
In what follows I will try to layout the basic setting
of the Bariloche model, with close attention to the problems
of techniques and methodology. If I seem to harp on the
shortcomings, it is only because I think that the project's
ｳ ｾ ｲ ｯ ｮ ｧ points are vitiated by inattention to some important
details. It is an incomplete model, one that cannot at present
be taken terribly seriousli as a normative or descriptive
model of the world economy; but nevertheless it represents
a significant improvement over the Limits to Growth models
which have been-used heretofore.
*The work discussed here was presented by the Fundacion
Bariloche in a series of forthcoming papers to be published.
by IIASA.
IMy objections to the World Dynamics and Limits to Growth
type of models are contained in "World Dynamics: Measurement
without Data," ThE Economic Journal, 83, 332 (December 1973),
1156-1183.
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The Underlying structure
The structure of the model can be described in terms of
five aspects: the philosophy, the techniques, the objective
function, the constraints, and the results. Before getting
into the details of the model, it is best to note one impor-
tant feature of the model which distinguishes it from earlier
models: the Bariloche model is an "optimizing" model, some-
times also called a normative model. Rather than attempting
to project future trends unconditionally, the Bariloche model
sets out an objective function for the different regions of
the world and maximizes this. This procedure has certain ad-
vantages and defects, to which we will return, but it is a
major break with earlier world models.
The Philosophy
The authors emphasize the need for an explicit philosoph-
ical and ethical basis ｦ ｯ ｾ their model. For the ｭ ｯ ｳ ｾ part,
optimizing models have been quite pedestrian in formulating
objective functions; thus we customarily find minimizing
cost or maximizing GNP as objectives in empirical growth
models. The Bariloche model is most imaginative in this
respect, for they have formulated a most unusual objective
function and have rationalized this on radical philosophical
grounds.
The documents presented by the Bariloche group teem with
ideology and fulmination against various ills. Much of it is
controversial; for the most part the philosophy is actually
irrelevant to the underlying objective function of the model.
Nevertheless it is useful to layout the normative aspects
of the model. According to the authors, the model Qas been
built around basic assumptions, of which the two following
are the most important.
(1) The final goal of the model is an egalitarian world so-
ciety. Whereas earlier models have stressed the possible
catastrophe faced by mankind in the future, the Bariloche
model draws attention to the actual catastrophe faced py the
majority of mankind today.
The most important manifestation of this egalitarianism
is that the report posits the basic principle that each human
being has the right to the satisfaction of a set of basic
needs; these are quantified in the model as a minimum stan-
dard of food, housing, health, and education.
(2) The society should tend to move toward a "non-consumist"
society. It is not clear what is meant by the term "consum-
ist,lI but it sometimes refers to the "fetishism ll of in-
creasing consumption, as an end in itself, and sometimes to
the consumption of material (or resource-intensive) goods.
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with these assumptions, the group plunges into the
middle of an extensive debate about the goals of economic
growth. Speaking personally, I find the first principle
quite convincing. It states that the provision of the
basic needs, defined quite concretely, of the majority of
mankind living today as well as in the future should be at
the very top of our list of priorities. Historically speak-
ing, it can be argued that societies have generally done
too much for future generations and too little for the poorer
members of current generations. And until we are convinced
that meeting the basic needs of today's poor countries will
lead to general impoverishment of the future, we should be
suspicious of counsels which favor the generalized future
at the expense of today's poor.
On'the other hand, I think that the Bariloche group's
hostility to the "consumist" society is misplaced. They
have perhaps confused the doctrine of consumer sovereignty,
the philosophical basis of much Western economic thinking,
with the crasser and generally ill-conceived desire ｾ ｯ maxi-
mize GNP. Modern economic thinking holds that GNP, especial-
ly GNP as conventionally measured, is not the proper index of
economic welfare; and certainly it is not the same as the
quality of life. Rather, modern ･ ｣ ｯ ｮ ｯ ｭ ｩ ｾ thinking rests on
the proposition that the preferences of the citizens--some-
how weighed and somehow determined--are taken as the ulti-
mate goals of economic society. Of course, there are the
familiar and insoluble problems associated with the issue of
innateness or adaptability of tastes, as well as the role
of externalities, information, and advertising; but these
should not cloud the basic proposition that it is the con-
sumer's own preferences--not the BBC's, or Galbraith's, or
the Bariloche group's--which are the ultimate touchstones of
value in a democratic society. The Bariloche group' argues
that it would be desirable to have a shift in emphasis to
"enlarge cultural options--increasing leisure time--instead
of increasing the consumption of material goods." The only
difference between the thinking of the Bariloche group and
modern Western economic thought is that the former thinks
the shift is definitely desirable, while the latter would
think it desirable only if consumers demonstrated (through
the appropriate market or non-market forces) that they would
prefer such a shift.
Aside from a misreading of current fuinking of the proper
direction of economic growth, there are two further strands
in the desire for the non-consumist society. First, the
Bariloche report stresses that the developed nations consume
the lion's share of the world's food and natural resources,
and that reduced growth of the developed world would reduce
the pressure on these goods. This is a very complicated
question, and the truth of the proposition is not at all clear.
We ,return to this in the section on results. More basic to
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the hostility to the consumist society, however, is the strand
of thinking which questions the role of competition and market-
domination in society. This also is a very sticky issue; they
are undoubtedly right that the competitive game that 'is played
in industrialized societies has immense social costs which
have to be weighed against the immense benefits. I have never
seen this problem persuasively answered, but I suspect that it
is difficult to prove that the competitive structure is clearly
an inferior form of organization.
In summary, they should concentrate their fire on the issue
of meeting the basic needs of the poor rather than on denigrat-
ing the value of consumption in developed countries. The im-
portant point is not that the automobile or the airplane is
inherently evil, but that the social importance of these pales
beside ｾ ｨ ･ basic needs for food, shelter, and other necessities.
Techniques
Before we get on to the interesting details of the model,
there is some methodological underbrush to be cleared away.
First, let us consider the use of statistical techniques. The
Bariloche model differs from the earliest Limits to Growth
models in that it makes significant use of statistical pro-
cedures for determining the parameters of the models. On the
other hand, the presentation of the statistical material is
considerably below the accustomed standards in scientific work:
only correlation coefficients are presented, without any indi-
cation of the standard errors of coefficients, or other useful
summary statistics. This apparently is not an oversight, for
at the conference one of the Bariloche group argued against
the use of statistical techniques, but there is apparently no
reference to this aversion in the written documentation. It
should be noted that even if the group prefers to ignore the
statistical tests, it is useful for others to present them,
since these are the standards in many sciences. Moreover,
it was perhaps a slip, but the group did appear to point to
the general goodness of fit of the relations in attempting
to demonstrate their validity.
Second, the major difficulty with using the Bariloche
model as a predictive model is that the authors have attempted
to be "conservative" or "pessimistic" about what is technolog-
ically ｰ ｯ ｳ ｳ ｩ ｢ ｬ ･ ｾ ·Thus in the economie .model, they have
assumed that there is no technological change, thinking that
this would be a kind of worst case, or a worst plausible
case. On the other hand, they appear to ｾ ･ "optimistic" in
other parts, such as the energy and natural resources sector.
The notion of "conservatism" is a most treacherous one,
and one which has been used in an unscientific way in this
as well as other global models. What does it mean to
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a projection is conservative? Presumably it means that there
is only a "small" subjective probability that the outcome can
be "worse" than the path under 'consideration. In what way
"worse," and how Il small"?
I do not see how these questions can be answered intelli-
gibly outside of a statistical (or a sUbjective-probability)
framework. I have seen no attempt in global modelling to
apply statistical decision making to the problem of model
validation and sensitivity analysis, but the statistical
approach is clear and relatively straightforward. Since the
sUbject is so important, I will spell it out in some ､ ｾ ｴ ｡ ｩ ｬ Ｎ
The Bariloche group has the followiDg problem: maximize
a function U(x) subject to constraints fl(X,y) :;: 0, i = 1, ... ,m,
where x and y-are vectors of variables. We are generally
interested not only in the validity of the structure (e.g.
accuracy of the functions), but also, and especially in ｷ ｯ ｾ ｬ ､
models, in the accuracy of the predictions. Thus in the
Limits to Growth model many of the criticisms were divected
both at the unrealism of the assumptions and the unreliability
of the conclusions.
In principle, we can formulate the problem of validation
of the simulation model as follows. Let us simplify the prob-
lem such that it is linear in a set of parameters a and b,
where (a,b) = (al, ... ,an,bl, ... ,b ): -
- - nm
subject to
n
max I:
{x} i=l
a·x·1 1
n
I: b .. x· = 0, j = l, ... ,m
, lJ 1i=l
Through a combination of prior restrictions and empirical
analysis, we can place a joint distribution on the a and b,
e.g. g(a,b). Through the maximization we get then a time-path
of the state variables, x, which is a function of the coeffi-
cients a and b, e.g. x(tT = ｾＨ｡Ｌ｢ＩＮ Finally the distribution
of a and b will ,lead to a distribution of the outcomes hex)
where h(xT = ｻｧＨｾＬﾣＩｉｾＨｾＬ｢Ｉ ｾ ｾｽＮ If ｾ is a one-to-one ｴ ｲ ｡ ｾ ｳ ﾭ
formation, we can wrlte hTx) as hex) = ｧｻｾＨ｡Ｌ｢ＩｽｊＬ where J lS
the Jacobian of the transformation-from Ｈ ｸ Ｉ ｾ ｩ ｮ ｴ ｯ Ｍ Ｈ ｡ Ｌ ｢ Ｉ Ｎ
(This formula applies only in a very restricted set of cases.)
An illustration is shown in Figure 1. This, of course, is
very similar to the problem of prediction intervals which come
out of the simplest linearregressi6n.
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There is nothing revolutionary about this suggestion;
rather it is simply the result of applying the normal operat-
ing rules of scientific enquiry to the arena of global
modelling. If it were carried out, in even a simplified way,
it would allow the predictions of the models to be subject
to the same kind of review as the output of other scientific
research. Up to now the evaluation of the predictions of
global modelling has been extremely difficult. An attempt
to validate them has been pretty much hit or miss, relying
on the intuition of the investigator to identify the impor-
tant variables. The procedure of statistical validation
would put validation on a much more objective basis.
A more important consideration is that a statistical
procedure would make the notion of conservatism or pessimism
a meaningful and quantifiable notion. The principle of
pessimism (or planning for rainy days) is indeed important;
it signifies that if we are unpleasantly surprised by the
outcome of population growth or technology we should not
find we have backed ourselves into a corner. But the.deci-
sions can be meaningful only if we know how remote the
possibilities of the pessimistic event are. How likely is
it that we will experience no technological change over the
next fifty years?
On a practical level, the requirement for statistical
validation would mean that it would be almost impossible to
test the grandiose world models used up to now. There are
hundreds or thousands of parameters, and to estimate the
"standard error" of the forecasts would be prohibitively ex-
pensive (even if the authors believed in such tests). But
this "impossibility conjecture" makes quite explicit some-
thing which has only been intuitively obvious about large
models: they are simply too big to evaluate. 'Until a group
can present at least a partial description of the probability
distribution of the output variables, similar- to that in
Figure 1, it has not completed 'its work of examining the
properties of its model.
In the Bariloche model I conjecture that these tests
would lead to major discontinuities in the outcome space,
that is, that small changes in some parameters would lead to
drastically different conclusions (for the reasoning, see
below).
Third, there is a minor point which was brought up in
the conference about the choice of model selection. It was
stated that the Limits to Growth model is. a poor model be-
cause the outcomes, or predictions, are very unstable with
respect to the model parameters. While it ia nice from a
mathematical point of view to have a stable moaeT; there is
nothing in human affairs which dictates this condition.
Indeed, the Bariloche model is a memper of what might be
f (a)
III I
x*
x =+(0)
IV
f(a)
Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ｪ Ｍ Ｍ ｴ Ｍ Ｚ ｾ ｾ ｴ ｟ ｟ ｟ Ｋ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｋ ｟ ｟ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ｟ Ｋ Ｍ Ｍ Ｍ ｑ
ｨ ＼ ｾ do 0*
=t[f<o)]dx
Figure 1. This figure shows the relation between the
distribution function of the unknown parameter
a and the output variable x. Quadrant I shows
the distribution function of the unknown param-
eter a, f(a), and the product of the density
function and the Jacobian of the transformation,
f(a)(da/dx). Quadrant II shows how the output
function is related to the unknown parameter.
Quadrant III is a reflective line, reflecting
f(a) (da/dx) into Quadrant IV. Quadrant IV shows
the resulting distribution of the output param-
eter. In this example (a*,x*) is the maximum
likelihood value of the unknown parameter and
the ·output variable.
Note that the conditions under which the distri-
bution of ｴ ｨ ｾ prediction path f[cP(a)] (da/dx) is
continuous with respect to the parameter, a, are
extremely stringent.
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called Malthus-Nelson models 2 which show multiple equilibria,
and some of the sensitivity analysis, as well as the runs
themselves, suggest that the model has multiple equilibria.
The Objective Function and Optimization
Perhaps the most original and interesting aspects of the
Bariloche model are the details of the objective function and
the optimization. The objective function is unique in two
respects: first, it is designed so that its basic variables
are quantifiable in natural units rather than in value units
(or utilities). Second, it is an objective function which
"satiates" at relatively low levels of performance.
More specifically, the basic objective is to
max (1 + qlife) le
subject to numerous constraints, where
Ie = life expectancy at birth
and
(1)
0, when the "basic needs" have not been
satisfied;
q life =
share of consumption (excluding "basic
needs") in GNP (including "basic needs"),
when basic needs have been satisfied.
As far as the basic needs are concerned, these are the
four categories mentioned above--food, education, housing,
and health--and the targets for these are set in quantitative
terms:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Calory intake per capita must exceed 3000 per day,
and in addition have a reserve for "rainy" days.
At least 98% of the relevant population must be
enrolled in school, from age six, for twelve years.
Each family must be provided with a "house" of
minimum quality; this is basically fifty square
meters plus certain sanitary and other equipment.
Health enters directly through the objective func-
tion.
The model then maXlmlzes the value of the objective
function subject to the constraints. The authors suggest
that in principle they would like to define the optimal path
as one which attains the required levels of the "basic needs"
in minimum time (and, presumably, stays there). Neither the
2The Nelson analysis of the Malthusian model appears as in
Richard R.Nelson, "A Theory of the Low-Level Equilibria Trap in
Underdeveloped Economies," Americ'an Economic Review, 46,4
(December 1956), pp.894-908.
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techniques nor the objective function seem designed to perform
that task well. The actual procedure is to maximize the ob-
jective function every year, i.e. myopically, without taking
into account the effect of current decisions upon future levels
of the "basic needs."
It is not clear whether the authors believe that the pro-
cedure actually used is equivalent to the technique of mini-
mizing the time to satisfy the basic needs and to stay there.
A simple example will show that in general it is not. Consider
a very simply economy in which there is a fixed pool of re-
sources R > T, and where T is the lifetime of the society,
life expectancy at birth is a concave function of consumption
of the resource, and where the basic needs require one unit per
period. A perfectly myopic policy, one which maximizes life
expectan.cy at birth, will have a "potlatch policy." All R
units will be consumed in the first period, after which society
collapses. (It is interesting 'to note that this policy looks
not dissimilar ｾ ｯ the outcomes for Africa and Asia in the model
runs without economic aid.) In this example, there are sever-
al policies for mihimizing ｴ ｩ ｾ ･ to meet basic needs and to stay
there since it can be done immediately; any sensible policy in
this context would surely not look like the myopic policy.
The surprise, at first blush, is that the outcomes of the
model runs do not look ridiculous (as does the myopic policy
just described). It is here that the constraints playa most
important role. It appears that the authors have constructed
the constraints so that it is not possible to have a potlatch
policy. The most important variable controlling the distri-
bution of consumption over time is the rate of investment, but
the runs are constrained within the ridiculously narrow band
of 21% to 25% of GNP during the phase before the basic needs
are satisfied. This constraint is puzzling, for it surely has
no serious ethical or economical rationale, until it is under-
stood that the myopic policy would drive the investment rate
,in a myopic direction. Other constraints can be interpreted in
ｾ similar manner.
As a result, it can be argued that the results of the
optimization cannot at this point be taken seriously as pre-
scriptions for development. It is imperative that the authors
quickly attack the problem of a more reasonable objective
function. I suspect, however, that this will be a most diffi-
cult problem because of the nature of the constraint set.
First, if they continue to use the objective function described
in equation (1), they will have difficulties because it has
a kink at that point where the basic needs are satisfied.
More significantly, I think that the underlying constraint set
is not a convex set because of the way in which consumption
has a restraining effect on population growth.
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A second question which is raised by the model is the
universality of the particular objective function they use.
The introduction of life expectancy as a primary variable
is explained as follows:
In the model, life expectancy at birth was
selected as the key variable to be maximized,
due to the fact that besides being affected
by all the endogenous socioeconomic variables
of the model, it is a much better indicator
of the real conditions of life in a society,
than a purely economic index as the gross
product. Moreover, it reflects quite clearly
an unequal distribution in a country or re-
gion when compared with the GNP per capita.
There are two strands in this argument: first that the life
expectancy is affected by all the endogenous variables, and
second that it lS a superior indicator. The first reason
is correct, but it is a very dangerous principle to use in
an optimizing model. To see the danger, suppose that the
true objective function is U (Ie, qlife) = 4/5 log (Ie) +
1/5 log (qlife), where U is a preference function, and Ie
and qlife are defined above, Further, let us assume that
in societies where development proceeds mbre or less without
control, the two variables (Ie and qlife) move very closely
together. Assume that the model has correctly described the
constraint set between them as (le2 + ｱｬｩｦ･ＲＩｾ = k, where k
is a function of time, labor and capital. The constraints
and objective function are shown in Figure 2, with the
"optimal" solution, e.g. the preference maximizing solution,
given at (le*, qlife*). .
Let us suppose that, within an optimizing framework,
we follow the reasoning cited above and use life expectancy
as a proxy variable for the true objective function. Clear-
ly, we would end up at point B in Figure 2, with a long but
miserable life. On the other hand, if we take the stereo-
type of the economic criterion ｾ ｵ ｮ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｌ maximizing the
quality of life, we end up at point E with a short but
affluent life. This problem is especially acute in optimiz-
ing models, where the optimization focuses with singleminded
obsession on objectives with high payoffs and ignores complete-
ly those with lOw payoffs. (The problem is compounded if the
feasible set is only imperfectly known. The optimal plan will
be even more distorted if some of the behavior relations are
measured with great error and no account is taken of this
in the optimization). .
In light of the cautions outlined above, the question is
whether the Bariloche group has used a distorted objective
.function. This is obviously a matter of society's preferences,
but for my taste they have overestimated the value of pure
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LIFE EXPECTANCY (le )
"ECONOMI ST S'''OPTIMUM
E
LEVEL LINE OF
PREFERENCE FUNCTION
u
BARILOCHE B Ｈｱｬｩｦ･ｾｬ･ＪＩ "TRUE" OPTIMUMOPTIMUM -......-_-
le =2 q li fe -.......--------""II'IIll.!........ｾＭＭ __U
PRODUCTION
FUNCTION
QUALITY OF LIFE (q life)
Figure 2. The figure shows the danger of using proxy variables
in optimization. The true preference function is UU,
while the constraint is BAE. A true optimum will lie
at A, while "single-minded" or proxy optima will lie
at B for the Bariloche optimum and at E for the
"economists'" optimum.
-12-
longevity and underestimated the value of the quality of
that longevity. It is much more difficult to construct an
objective function with all the aspects of a desirable life
style; but if we are to avoid the distortion of looking at
single indices (whether GNP or life expectancy) we must do
it right. The use of GNP (or more properly, a generalized
consumption measure) in optimizing programs is open to many
objectives, but the usual objections are that the usual
accounting system is too narrow, not that it is too broad.
If we are to correct for the deficiencies of the GNP, we
must include many items which are left out (leisure, culture,
environmental goods, etc.). The Bariloche group has gone
in the opposite direction, leaving out important variables
which usually are thought to enter into economic welfare.
For all its shortcomings, I think that some generalized
consumpt.ion measure (including perhaps physical constraints
of the kind used by the Bariloche group and correcting for
the length of life) should be ｵ ｳ ･ ｾ Ｌ instead of the simpler
objective function of life expectancy.
If the Bariloche group is to continue to use the objec-
tive now in the model, there is one further problem which
should be noted. Turning back to the objective function,
note that until the basic needs are met the objective function
is simply life expectancy. It is much more in accord with the
reasoning of the group to give a very high weight to attain-
ment of the objective of meeting the basic needs. The prob-
lem is illustrated in Figure 3. Forgetting about housing and
education (assuming that these.are costless), the objective
function is simply (1 + O)le, or Ie until the food constraint
" t" f" d d th 1 (1 Consumption)llS sa lS le , an en equa to + G.N.P. e after that
point. This seems a pretty paltry reward for attaining the ob-
jective of meeting the basic needs.
A better way of representing the importance of meeting the
basic needs would be to have a stronger reward for attaining
the basic needs. Perhaps have no reward until basic needs are
satisfied (such as having the objective function be 0 if they
are not all met).
A related problem is the use of the share of consumption
in GNP as the index of the quality of life. I cannot imagine
how this could ｾ ｡ ｶ ･ arisen. Perhaps it comes from the idea
of a relative income notion, that once the basic needs are
satisfied, further consumption is like drugs in simply build-
ing up craving for further goods (is this the definition of
a consumist society?). Perhaps in some ultimate way humans
do satiate at some level of consumption around that now
experienced in the United states or Western Europe; if this
is the idea, it should be introduced explicitly rather than
through the share of consumption.
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OBJECTIVE
FUNCTION
1 Ie
3050 CALORIES
Figure 3. This figure shows how the objective function
varies with the level of the basic needs.
Note that there is no penalty when the level
of calories is less than the minimum, whereas
a jump takes place as Soon as the basic level
is reached.
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Within most systems there are "policy variables" which
can be to some degree affected or determined by the agents,
whether these be economic, political, or social. These policy
variables include the rate of investment, the allocation of
investment and labor between the different sectors, the level
of taxation or subsidy of different sectors, the extent of
family planning, and so forth. What is the proper way of
treating these variables in world models? Some earlier models
(World Dynamics and The Limits to Growth) were accused of
simply projecting the trends rather than providing for some
adaptive response in the policy variables; other models,
particularly economic models, have been accused of assuming
too optimistic a level of responsiveness of markets and
pOlicies to changes in economic conditions.
In general there are two kinds of approaches to the
treatment of policy variables. The first (which would be
the technique of modern political science) would be to treat
the decision makers as behavioral, and to derive the corre-
sponding behavioral relations. ThUS, one would try to deter-
mine the actions which were profit-maximizing on the part of
firms, preference-maximizing on the part of consumers, vote-
maximizing on the part of competing politicians, and work-
minimizing on the part of bureaucrats.
If the behavioral regularities were difficult to estimate
one could substitute the preference function of the agents
into the problem and maximize the agents' objective function.
(Interestingly, one of the justifications of the myopic ob-
jective function used by the Bariloche group was that govern-
ments tend to be myopic.) This approach is really a descrip-
tive one, using optimization as a technique, since it uses
the decision maker's rather than a more general objective
function. A more traditional optimization would be to use
a general objective function, rather than that of a single
interest group. This has been the approach of the literature
on optimal economic growth, following the tradition going
back at least to Jeremy Bentham. This can also be described
as a way of tracing out the set of feasible strategies for
an economy.
It is not clear which of these approaches the Bariloche
model has followed, although the language is basically that
of the second, and truly optimizing approach. It should be
stressed that if the goal is true optimization it is impera-
tive that a global rather than a myopic objective function
be used.
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The Constraints
The constraints on the world economy define the bounda-
ries within which any optimization must lie. Roughly speak-
ing, there are three sets of constraints: economic, demo-
graphic, and "realistic" constraints. The economic con-
straints are sets of conditions which limit the production
of the various sectors of the economy, where the limits are
the amount of primary factors--capital, land, and labor--
which are available. These are taken to be the well-known
Cobb-Douglas production functions:
Q. = K.1 1
a.
1
I-a.
1(L. A. )
1 1
, i = 1 , . . . , 5 ,
where A.. is implicitly the productivity of labor and Q, L,
and K ｡ｾ･ output, labor, and capital, respectively. The five
sectors are food, housing services, eduction, other consump-
tion, and capital goods. The usual constraints on total
labor and capital, as weli as capital accumulation, appear
to be observed. I could find no reference to the allocation
of land, but it appears that land is allocated between sec-
tors according to a linear programming subroutine. It would
seem more natural to include land in the basic production
functions.
There are many questions which arise in the economic
model, but the most important are the following:
First, it is explicitly assumed that there is no further
technological change in any sector or any country. This 1S
an extreme assumption, explained by the desire to be "pessi-
mistic" in drawing conclusions. As noted above, it would be
far superior to treat the problem from a decision-theoretic
point of view so that the degree of conservatism could be
judged. As we will indicate later, this is a crucial question
in judging the verisimilitude of the results.
The economic blocks in the model are completely separate
in their economic relations. There is no room for trade,
imperialism, exploitation, cartels, terms of trade or any
of the other interesting features of international economic
relations. In fact, the only link between the blocks is
capital flows (9r economic aid) which is imposed in the sec-
ond major run of the world model.
Further there are no resource, energy, and pollution
constraints in the economic model. In earlier global models,
especially the Limits to Growth, these three factors formed
important constraints on the economic growth of the world
economy. The Bariloche model, on the other hand, investigates
the problems posed by these three sectors and concludes that it
is more a problem of cost than of absolute limits. Thus
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by going to lower grade mineral resources the necessary
minerals can be found; by going to new technologies the
requisite energy resources can be produced; and by paying
attention to environmental constraints clean, if slightly
more expensive, technologies ｣ ｡ ｮ ｾ ｢ ･ used. The reasoning
was on the whole convincing. On the other hand, I detected
an optimism about the advent of new technologies that does
not square either with the professed pessimism of the re-
port or with some nasty details of the new technologies;
in particular, I think they may have underestimated some
of the environmental problems and other costs of new tech-
nologies.
The demographic part of the model is more difficult to
evaluate. The most important difference from earlier world
models is that the Bariloche group has used estimated rather
than hypothetical equations; thus the parameters of the
birth, mortality, and other functions are drawn from cross-
sectional data on more than 100 countries. For this reason
they observe the phenomenon known as the demographic tran-
sition--that the rate of growth of population declines after
countries have reached a certain level of economic develop-
ment. (Ignoring this phenomenon was the essential reason
that the earlier models of Forrester and Meadows et al. found
such pessimistic conclusions.)
As far as the exact equations are concerned, they seem
somewhat dubious. It is very difficult to assess the extent
to which the parameters are well determined without the
standard errors of the coefficients. Moreover, the demo-
graphic model seems to contain inconsistencies; the birth
rate and the mortality rate are separately determined from
the fraction of the population between 0 and 9, 10 and 14,
and so forth. Thus one variable (calorie consumption) affects
the birth rate and the mortality rate without affecting life
expectancy: how is this possible? Slmilarly, the distribu-
tion of the population is determined by a variable which does
not affect the birth or death rates or the life expectancy
(e.g. T.e. [an unidentifled variable]). Perhaps it was too
complex to build up a correct life table, but the inconsisten-
cy is somewhat disturbing.
In addition to the constrainm already discussed, there
are a number of what appear to me to be essentially nuisance
constraints. These fall into two categories: flow constraints
and level constraints.
The flow constraints are those which keep the system from
moving from one position to another too rapidly. They make
good sense, in that there is considerable inertia in economic
and social systems, but they are essentially arbitrary. These
constraints, for example, mean that prices cannot change too
rapidly, that enrollment cannot grow faster than 10% annually,
and so forth. In addition, there is one flow constraint which
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insists that the basic needs (calories, housing, and enroll-
ment) cannot decline from one year to the next. This is
stated as an objective, but it is" hard to know whether it is
very costly; I could conceive of situations where a temporary
decline in consumption could be tolerable.
In addition there are level constraints. The most impor-
tant, and to me the most objectionable, is the straitjacket
put on investment. In the period before the basic needs have
been met the investment rate is constrained to lie between
21% and 25% of GNP. I can conceive of no general value system
which would impose this rule. It essentially fixes the invest-
ment rate. One interpretation, in light of an earlier inter-
pretation, is that this constraint is imposed to prevent the
system from consuming everything immediately--a path which
would probably be dictated by the myopic objective function.
A similar constraint is that general consumption (sector
4) must never be below 42% of GNP. This seems a rather strange
constraint for a model which is critical of the "consumist"
developed economies. Again, it is probable that this constraint
is imposed by the objective function: recall that the objective
function in the early stages rewards only life expectancy. On
the other hand, general consumption (sector 4) does not help
life expectancy. A myopic optimization would presumably drive
consumption to zero, along with capital investment, so it
would be necessary to impose the external constraint on the
share of consumption.
In both these cases, the myopic objective function has
produced a distortion in the growth path and thereby led to
the imposition of dubious constraints.
The Results
A set of "results of the Bariloche model was presented
at the conference at Baden, and these will be discussed very
briefly here given that they are preliminary.
The simulations were run for four blocks, (1) the devel-
oped countries, (2) Latin America, (3) Africa, and (4) Asia.
In run I, each block evolved completely on its own, with no
capital flows or economic aid from outside blocks. In this
run blocks 1 and 2 continued to grow and reached a kind of
satiation level, while groups 3 and 4 had an initial burst
of growth, then ran out of gas and declined. The reasons that
Africa and Asia did not "make it" are not spelled out, but I
would guess that they did not make it past the demographic
transition; thus they had initial increases in consumption,
enrollment, calories, etc., but these were insufficient to
reduce the rate of growth of population. Thus population
continued to grow very rapidly, around 2.5% annually, leading
to exhaustion of available land and finally deterioration
of the living standards. Latin America, on the other hand,
made it over the demographic transition and the rate of popu-
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lation growth declined steadily from around 2.5% in the
early 1970's to 0.5% by. '2020.
A second run was presented in which the developed econo-
mies gave aid to Africa and Asia, where the aid amounted to
2% of the GNP of the developed countries. In this case, Africa
and Asia made it over the demographic transition and their
development looked very much like that of Latin America.
The report concludes with the statement: "In conclusion
the run shows that the developed countries, by allocating to
economic aid half of the funds they are now devoting to the
arms race, can decisively contribute to rescue more than a
half of mankind from its present misery."
In ,many ways the runs are the most fascinating part of
the report; they show in a very dramatic way the way that a
population behaving according to the theory of the demographic
transition can lead to very different paths of economic devel-
opment according to the initial conditions and the economic
policy. At the same time, however, it seems to me that the
runs cannot be taken very seriously as descriptions of the
options facing mankind.
First, because of the conservative nature of some of the
assumptions, the runs may underestimate the potential for
growth of the different countries. Perhaps the most impor-
tant of these conservative assumptions is that there will be
no further technological change in the developing countries.
When confronted with this criticism, the Bariloche group
offered to make a run in which technological change occurred.
The particular parameters used were that all sectors would
have the same rate of productivity growth experienced by the
United States from 1889 to 1953. 3 (Is this optimistic?)
The results showed a completely different pattern from
those presented in the written report; in particular, all
blocks grew quite rapidly and attained the minimum level of
the basic needs within a very short period of time, even with-
out economic aid.
There are of course very difficult questions involved in
the projection of technological change over time. At the very
least, this alternative run shows that the forecast path is
quite unstable with respect to the parameters for technological
change; at the most, these results show that the Bariloche model
is grossly pessimistic about the future in poor countries when
even myopically optimal policies are ｦ ｯ ｬ ｬ ｯ ｷ ｾ ､ Ｎ
3For the basis of the estimates, see J.W. Kendrick,
Productivity Trends in the United States, Princeton, N.J.,
Princeton University Press, 1960, pp.136-137.
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The second reason for questioning the results is the
myopic objective function followed. It seems very likely
that if a global objective function is used, such as mini-
mizing the time to meet the minimum basic needs and to stay
there, such a path could be found. This of course remains
conjecture at this stage and will be tested in the future
when the Bariloche group presents further results.
One other set of results, or perhaps attitudes, of the
Bariloche model should be weighed. This is the view of the
group about the role of economic growth in the developed
countries on the future of the underdeveloped countries. The
group argues that the continued growth of the developed coun-
tries is undesirable, as noted above. Yet in the model there
are no links, aside from aid, between the two groups. It
seems out of place to argue on the one hand that there are no
physical limits to growth, and to hold on the other hand that
rapid growth in the developed countries is a drag on the growth
of the underdeveloped countries. It is clear, for example, in
the model with economic aid that rapid growth in the developed
countries would lead to more rapid development of other coun-
tries, since the aid is a fixed fraction of the GNP of the
developed countries. Some have argued, in addition, that the
fraction of GNP contributed in economic aid is likely to be
higher in a growing economy than in a stagnant economy, but
this is more difficult to demonstrate. In any case, the
economic argument against growth in the developed countries
is very weak. In a more realistic model with trade the gener-
al presumption would be that more ｲ ｡ ｰ ｾ ､ growth in developed
economies would stimulate the developing economies through
the effects on the terms of trade and the demand for exports,
in addition to any effect on capital flows or capital trans-
fers.
The chief argument against growth in developed countries
is probably the "demonstration effect"--that growth in devel-
oped countries· stimulates the wasteful diversion of surplus
of developing countries to luxury consumption. In addition,
there is the simple but powerful value judgment that great
discrepancies in the distribution of consumption are ugly.
But these costs of growth in the developed countries must
be weighed against the presumptive economic evidence that
growth in the developed countries would be helpful for econom-
ic development 9f less developed countries.
